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In this paper I argue that human beings should reason, not in accordance with 
classical logic, but in accordance with a weaker ‘reticent logic’. I characterize reticent 
logic, and then show that arguments for the existence of fundamental Gödelian 
limitations on artificial intelligence are undermined by the idea that we should reason 
reticently, not classically. !
1.$Introduction$
In this paper I argue that human beings should reason, not in accordance with 
classical logic (CL), but in accordance with what I will call ‘reticent logic’ (RL). To 
see why we shouldn’t reason classically, imagine two prisoners, locked in Cells A and 
B respectively. Each prisoner is given a list of sentences, and can choose whether to 
‘accept’ sentences in the list. We can suppose a prisoner accepts a sentence by 
checking a box next to it. I am one of the prisoners. Initially I don’t know whether I 
am in Cell A or Cell B, but I know it will be announced soon which cell I am in. 
My list looks like this: 
 
1: If I am Cell B’s inmate, then Cell B’s inmate will never accept 3. ◻ 
2: I am Cell B’s inmate.       ◻  
3: Cell B’s inmate will never accept 3.     ◻ 
 
My aim is to accept only true sentences. (E.g., imagine one year will be 
deducted from my prison-sentence for each true sentence I accept, but a year added 
for each false sentence.) If Cell B’s inmate was to accept 3, then 3 would be false, and 
so Cell B’s inmate would have accepted a falsehood. Recognizing this, I resolve that 
if it is announced that I am Cell B’s inmate I will never accept 3.1 My track record of 
following through on such resolutions is perfect. Hence I have good grounds for 
thinking that if I am Cell B’s inmate, then Cell B’s inmate will never accept 3. This is 
what 1 says. Accordingly I accept 1, by checking its box.  
Next it is announced that I am Cell B’s inmate, and so I check 2’s box. 
CL includes the rule of inference, modus ponens, which validates the inference 
from 1 and 2 to 3. Thus 1,2⊢3 (henceforth, the prisoner’s argument) is classically 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 If the word ‘never’ raises intuitionistic worries about permanently undetermined truth-values, then it 
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valid. So were I to reason classically then I would, having accepted 1 and 2, also 
accept 3. However, I would falsify both 1 and 3 by accepting 3.2 
What are my options? There appear to be four: 
(i) I might accept 1 and 2, reason classically, and accept 3. This is a bad 
option, for as just seen it results in me accepting only one truth and two falsehoods. 
(ii) I might accept 1 and 2, but refuse to accept 3, even though 3 is classically 
entailed by 1 and 2. This option is attractive, since it results in me accepting two 
truths and no falsehoods. However it means I must reason non-classically. 
(iii) Foreseeing a trap, I might refuse to accept either 1 or 2 so CL won’t push 
me into accepting 3. This option is unattractive for two reasons. First it results in me 
accepting only one truth, instead of the two truths I get to accept under option (ii). (If 
I am to refuse to accept a sentence I can plainly see to be true, better it be 3 rather 
than 1 or 2.) Second, both 1 and 2 might be classically entailed by other statements I 
can see to be true, creating a risk of escalation: to avoid being forced by CL into 
accepting 3, I might have to refuse to accept, not only 1 or 2, but numerous other true 
propositions from which 1 and 2 can be derived. 
(iv) 3 is self-referential, and in this respect similar to the strengthened liar 
sentence (‘This sentence is untrue’), which lacks coherent truth-conditions. It might 
be suggested on this basis that 3 lacks coherent truth-conditions too. If this were right 
then 3 wouldn’t be classically entailed by 1 and 2, dissolving the problem. However, 
this option appears untenable. The strengthened liar sentence is paradoxical because 
any attempt to assign it a truth-value yields contradiction: the supposition it is true 
supports the conclusion it is untrue, and vice versa. In contrast, neither the supposition 
that 3 is true nor the supposition it is untrue is contradictory. Rather, to suppose 3 is 
true is merely to suppose that Cell B’s inmate never checks the third box on his list, 
while to suppose 3 is untrue is to suppose that Cell B’s inmate will eventually check 
this box. 3’s truth conditions are therefore unproblematic.3  
Since (ii) is the best of these options, the prisoner’s argument provides strong 
prime facie support for the idea that we shouldn’t reason classically. But according to 
which logic should we reason, if not CL? This paper is structured as follows. §2 
introduces the key notion of a ‘perverse argument’. §3 describes RL and argues we 
should reason reticently, rather than classically. It also briefly outlines several sub-
varieties of RL. §4 and §5 showcase philosophical applications of the claim that we 
should reason reticently, with §4 critiquing a Gödellian argument against the 
possibility of an artificial intelligent machine knowing itself to be consistent, and §5 
critiquing the famous ‘mathematical argument’ against artificial intelligence. §6 
wraps things up.  
  
2.$Perverse$arguments$
To ‘accept’ a sentence is to perform some mechanical action by which one 
endorses it as being true. For example, in the scenario just discussed the prisoner 
‘accepts’ a sentence by ticking a box next to it. A formal system can be regarded as !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Is the prisoner’s argument a counterexample to modus ponens? No—or at least, not if by 
‘counterexample’ we mean a case where both φ and φ→ψ are true but ψ is false. The prisoner’s 
argument is instead a case in which φ and φ→ψ can both be true only if ψ is not accepted. 
3  Lingering suspicions that 3 is liar-like should be put to rest by noticing that Gödel’s (1931) 
diagonalization procedure for generating self-referential sentences with well defined truth-conditions 
can be used to manufacture a version of 3. See §5, below, for an explanation of how this procedure can 
be applied to English.  
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‘accepting’ a sentence by proving it as a theorem. A person can be regarded as 
‘accepting’ a sentence, φ, by believing φ (i.e., by loading φ into her ‘belief box’, as it 
were), or by saying, “φ is true” or “I accept φ”. The notion of acceptance is intended 
to be a general one, having each of these other notions as special cases. 
Notation. Let ◻φ be shorthand for ‘This system will ultimately accept φ’ (or ‘I 
will ultimately accept φ’).4 So, if a system accepts both φ and ◻ ︎φ, then it thereby 
ensures that the latter sentence is true by accepting the former sentence. On the other 
hand, if it accepts ◻ ︎φ but never accepts φ, then in accepting ◻ ︎φ it accepts a falsehood.  
With this notation in place, the prisoner’s argument is revealed as having the 
following form: 
 
A0.  (P∧Q)→¬◻ ︎Q 
A1.  P→Q 
A2.  P 
A3. Q 
 
 Here P stands for ‘This system is Cell B’s inmate’. Q stands for ‘Cell B’s 
inmate will never accept Q’. A0 isn’t an explicit premise of the prisoner’s argument, 
but is a tautological adjunct to the argument. It says, ‘If this system is Cell B’s inmate 
and Cell B’s inmate will never accept Q, then it is not the case that this system will 
ultimately accept Q’.  
 A0, A1 and A2 together classically entail both Q and ¬◻Q. That is, they 
classically entail both that Q is the case and that Q won’t be accepted by the system. 
Let such arguments be called perverse. I.e., an argument is perverse iff: (a) its 
conclusion, φ, is classically entailed by its premises (i.e., the argument is classically 
valid); and (b) ¬◻φ is also classically entailed by its premises. More generally, a 
proposition-set is perverse iff there is some φ such that the set classically entails both 
φ and ¬◻φ.  
Perversity isn’t to be confused with inconsistency. For example, the prisoner’s 
argument’s premises are perverse and yet clearly consistent (as can be seen by 
noticing that if I am Cell B’s inmate and I never accept 3, then both 1 and 2 will be 
true). 
 Let S⊢φ#be some perverse argument. A system which reasons classically from 
S will commit a kind of fallacy—the ‘perversity fallacy’ as I shall call it. In accepting 
S, it is committed, on pain of having accepted a falsehood, to not accepting φ (since S 
entails ¬◻ ︎φ), and yet because it reasons classically and S classically entails φ, it will 
accept φ. Thus by accepting φ it ensures the falsity of S, thereby undermining its 
grounds for concluding that φ is true in the very act of drawing this selfsame 
conclusion. Such a classical reasoning system is like a moth flying in the dark near a 
candle. Just as the moth’s method of navigation dooms it to the flame, so a system 
that reasons classically will blunder inevitably into error if a perversity lurks in the 
base of sentences it is reasoning from. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 I borrow the ‘◻ ︎’ notation from provability logic, wherein the intended meaning of ‘◻ ︎φ’ is ‘φ is 
provable in Peano Arithmetic’. In using this notion I don’t mean to suggest that RL is a standard modal 
logic. (It isn’t.)  
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3.$Reticent$Logic$(RL)$
 The idea behind RL is that to avoid succumbing to the perversity fallacy we 
should always do a ‘perversity check’ before accepting the conclusion of a classically 
valid argument. A reticent logic (RL) is simply a logic that includes a perversity 
check. Such a logic is ‘reticent’ in the sense that it ‘holds back’ in some cases when 
CL blithely accepts the conclusion of a perverse argument. 
 This idea can be implemented in various ways, of varying sophistication, some 
of which are now briefly explained.  
 
3.1$Basic$RL$
Basic RL classifies arguments as reticently valid or reticently invalid. S⊢φ will 
be classified as reticently valid if these two conditions are satisfied: 
 
(a) S⊢φ is classically valid. 
(b) S⊢¬◻ ︎φ is not classically valid (i.e., S⊢φ passes the ‘perversity 
check’).5 
 
Otherwise S⊢φ is classified as reticently invalid. 
 For example, although the prisoner’s argument is classically valid, Basic RL 
classifies it as reticently invalid. This is because A0, A1 and A2 classically entail not 
only Q, but also ¬◻ ︎Q. 
 Basic RL is weaker than CL, in the sense that while every reticently valid 
argument is classically valid, some classically valid arguments are not reticently valid. 
It can be thought of as being a logic of two parts, these being: (i) CL’s methods for 
classifying an argument as classically valid or classically invalid; and (ii) a 
‘devalidating rule’ that reclassifies perverse classically valid arguments as ‘invalid’. 
In other words, it is a logic that sets the bar for validity higher than CL, by demanding 
not only that it be impossible for the premises to be true whilst the conclusion is false, 
but also that it be possible for the premises to be true whilst the conclusion is 
accepted. 
 
3.2$Stepwise$RL$
 By a ‘logic’ we usually mean not just a method for classifying arguments as 
valid or invalid, but a set of rules of inference that allow the conclusion of a valid 
argument to be derived from the argument’s premises through a series of intermediate 
steps. Perversities might lurk at any step. A stepwise RL is a version of RL that 
performs a perversity check at each step. It consists of a set of reticent rules of 
inference, that differ from the classical rules by dint of having perversity checks built 
into them. For example, the classical and reticent versions of modus ponens differ 
from each other as follows: !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!5!The perversity check will be straightforward if the language is that of propositional logic or unary 
predicate logic, since it will then be decidable whether S⊢¬◻ ︎φ is classically valid. For richer languages 
it will be necessary to make do with an incomplete perversity testing method, that errs by sometimes 
failing to classify perverse arguments as perverse. For every such method there will be a corresponding 
version of Basic RL, with its own strengths and weaknesses where its ability to detect perversities is 
concerned. The question as to which of such methods are ‘best’ is rich and complex, but I say no more 
about it here. 
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Classical modus ponens: if both ψ and ψ→φ are accepted, then accept φ. 
 
Reticent modus ponens: if, (i) both ψ and ψ→φ are accepted, and (ii) ¬◻ ︎φ isn’t 
classically derivable from any sentences that are already accepted, then accept φ.   
 
 Detecting whether condition (ii) is satisfied requires a meta-level test to be 
conducted, to see whether ¬◻ ︎φ is classically entailed by the sentences accepted to 
date. Doing this meta-level test for classical validity will typically require invoking 
the ordinary, classical rules of inference multiple times. Hence the reticent rules of 
inference presuppose the classical rules. One can therefore accept this paper’s 
thesis—that we should reason reticently rather than classically—while still 
maintaining that there remains a strong sense in which CL is the most fundamental 
logic.  
 
3.3$Weak$RL$
Consider Argument B: 
 
B1. P 
B2. P→Q 
B3. (◻ ︎P)→¬◻ ︎Q 
B4. Q 
 
 Is this argument perverse? No: for the premises classically entail only Q, not 
¬◻ ︎Q. But there is a similar fallacy involved in accepting the conclusion of this 
argument if one accepts all its premises. In accepting B1 one ensures that ◻P is true. 
◻ ︎P and B3 together classically entail ¬◻Q: i.e., that Q will not be accepted. Thus by 
accepting Q, one would falsify B3 and make it the case that one has accepted a 
falsehood. 
 Next, consider Argument C: 
 
C1. ◻P 
C2. (◻P)→Q 
C3. P→¬◻ ︎Q 
C4. Q 
 
 Again this argument isn’t perverse but a similar fallacy lurks in it. By 
accepting C1, one commits oneself, on pain of having accepted a falsehood, to 
accepting P. In accepting P together with C3 one is committed to the truth of ¬◻ ︎Q—
i.e., to not accepting the argument’s conclusion. So if one accepts the conclusion in 
addition to the premises then one has accepted at least one falsehood. 
 Finally, consider Argument D: 
 
D1. ¬P 
D2. ¬︎P→Q 
D3. ¬◻ ︎P→¬◻ ︎Q 
D4. Q 
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 Yet again, this argument is not perverse but contains a similar fallacy. By 
accepting D1 (which is to say, ¬P), one is committed, on pain of contradicting 
oneself, to not accepting P. That is, one is committed to the truth of ¬◻ ︎P. But ¬◻ ︎P 
and D3 together classically entail ¬◻ ︎Q. So by accepting D1, D2 and D3 one in effect 
commits oneself, on pain of having accepted a falsehood, to not accepting the 
argument’s conclusion, Q.  
 To enable the detection and avoidance of fallacies like the above, a rule of 
inference, U, and axiom, V, may be introduced. 
 
Rule U:  If any formula, φ, is accepted, then ◻ ︎φ may be accepted too.  
 
Axiom V: (◻ ︎φ)→φ 
 
 Rule U is obviously well motivated. It enables a system that has accepted φ to 
accept it has done so—i.e., to accept ◻ ︎φ. (It makes the system ‘self conscious’, so to 
speak.) It is ‘truth preserving’, since it will never directly cause a system to accept a 
falsehood.  
Axiom V is similarly well motivated, for upon accepting ◻φ, a system is 
committed, on pain of having accepted a falsehood, to accepting φ too. V lets the 
system discharge this commitment. The inference step from ◻ ︎φ to φ is truth 
preserving in the sense that a system that has accepted ◻ ︎φ has ‘burnt its bridges’ and 
can only hope to keep its set of accepted sentences free of falsehoods by accepting φ 
too.6  
V is logically equivalent to its contrapositive, V!:  
 
V!: ¬φ→(¬◻ ︎φ) 
 
 V! allows a system to derive ¬◻ ︎φ from ¬φ. Again this inference step appears 
reasonable: for if a system has accepted ¬φ then it is committed, on pain of 
contradicting itself, to not accepting φ, and thus to the truth of ¬◻ ︎φ.7 
 Let UV logic be a logic obtained by adding U and V (and hence V!) to CL. An 
argument’s premises UV-entail its conclusion iff the conclusion is derivable from the 
premises using UV logic. An argument is neo-perverse if it is not perverse, but if it is 
such that: (i) its premises classically entail its conclusion, φ; and (ii) its premises UV-
entail ¬◻ ︎φ. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 From the fact that the system has accepted ◻φ, it does not follow that φ is true. But it does follow that 
if the system fails to accept φ, then its risk of having accepted a falsehood is 100%. 
7 Suppose a set of premises are inconsistent, classically entailing both φ and ¬φ. Suppose too that ¬φ is 
accepted. V! then permits ¬◻φ to be accepted, which will then cause RL’s devalidating rule to prevent 
φ being accepted. Thus the system will be ‘consistent’ from the perspective of RL (in the sense that 
both φ and ¬φ will not be derivable) despite being classically inconsistent. Obviously, this variety of 
guaranteed consistency is trivial and uninteresting. Should we reject V! (and thus V) because it 
‘debases’ consistency in this way? I think not. After all, CL also yields a peculiar result – ‘logical 
explosion’ – when premises are classically inconsistent. RL is designed to keep us out of trouble, not 
when our premises are classically inconsistent (in which case a paraconsistent logic is called for), but 
when our premises are classically consistent but contain a perversity or neo-perversity. V! is vital in 
enabling certain neo-perversities to be detected. (Many thanks to Doukas Kapantais for comments on 
this point.) 
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 For example, Arguments B, C and D are neo-perverse. They are neo-perverse 
because their premises classically entail their (shared) conclusion, Q, and because 
their premises also UV-entail ¬◻Q. The three arguments differ with respect to 
whether it is U, V or V! that is crucial in enabling the neo-perversity to be detected. 
With Argument B, U is crucial (allowing ◻P to be derived from B1). With Argument 
C, it is V that is important (allowing P to be derived from C1). And with Argument D, 
V! plays the key role (allowing ¬◻ ︎P to be derived from D1). 
 Let the neo-perversity fallacy be the fallacy of accepting the conclusion of a 
neo-perverse argument. For instance, one would commit this fallacy by reasoning 
classically from the premises of Arguments B, C or D. Let a Weak Reticent Logic 
(Weak RL) be a version of RL that includes not only a perversity check, but also a 
neo-perversity check, and which is therefore capable of detecting and avoiding both 
perversity fallacies and neo-perversity fallacies. To be more precise, it is a version of 
RL such that the conclusion, φ, of a classically valid argument will be accepted only if 
¬◻ ︎φ isn’t UV-entailed (or classically entailed) by the argument’s premises. 
 As explained above, Basic RL is weaker than CL, in the sense that it validates 
only a proper subset of the arguments validated by CL. ‘Weak RL’ is so-called 
because it validates only a proper subset of the argument validated by Basic RL, 
making it an even weaker logic than Basic RL. 
 An explanation is in order as to why U is a rule of inference, instead of being 
an axiom, like V. What would be wrong with replacing U with the axiom, W?8 
 
W: φ→(◻ ︎φ) 
  
  It might appear that W achieves the same effect as U. For instance, W would, 
like U, enable us to detect that Argument B is neo-perverse, by allowing us to derive 
◻ ︎P from B1.  
To see the problem, notice that W is logically equivalent to its contrapositive, 
W!: 
 
W!:   (¬◻ ︎φ)→¬︎φ 
 
 W! is problematic. Suppose one has accepted a perverse set of sentences that 
classically entail both φ and ¬◻ ︎φ. RL tells one not to accept φ in this situation. But of 
course this is not to suggest that one should accept φ’s denial, ¬φ. To the contrary, 
one obviously shouldn’t accept ¬φ in such cases, for were one to accept ¬φ in 
addition to the sentences one already accepts (which entail φ), then one would be 
inconsistent. W! would allow one to derive ¬φ from ¬◻φ in such cases. For this 
reason W! can’t have any place among the axioms of RL, and nor can W, which is 
logically equivalent to W!.9 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 It is immediately clear that W and V cannot both be axioms: for together they entail φ↔(◻φ) and so 
drain the ‘◻’ operator of significance (Jack Copeland, personal communication). 
9 Why can’t W (and thus W!) be derived using U, as follows? First, assume φ. Then use U to derive ◻ ︎φ 
from φ. Then, by the rule of conditional introduction, derive φ→◻(φ). Answer: in RL it is crucial to 
distinguish between propositions that have the status of being accepted and propositions that merely 
have the status of being assumed for the purpose of proving a conditional. U can only be used to derive 
◻ ︎φ from φ when φ has been accepted, not when φ has only been assumed.  
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3.4$Strong$RL$
 The above versions of RL are all strictly weaker than CL, in the sense that 
they each validate only a proper subset of the inferences validated by CL (those that 
are not perverse and/or neo-perverse). What I call a ‘Strong RL’ is, on the other hand, 
a version of RL that validates certain inferences that are not classically valid. It does 
this by using U and V, not only at the meta-level where inferences are checked for 
perversities and neo-perversities, but also at the base level where inferences are first 
generated. That is, it differs from Weak RL in that, whereas Weak RL uses CL at the 
base level and UV-logic at the meta-level, Strong RL uses UV-logic at both levels. 
 For example, consider Argument E: 
 
E1. P 
E2. ◻Q 
E3. (◻P∧Q∧¬◻¬P)→R 
E4. R 
 
This argument isn’t classically valid, and so, of course, it isn’t valid by the 
lights of Weak RL, either. But someone who has accepted its premises is nonetheless 
committed to the truth of its conclusion. To see this, notice that in accepting E1, one 
makes it the case that ◻P is true. Similarly, in accepting E2 one commits oneself, on 
pain of having accepted a falsehood, to accepting Q, and thus one commits oneself to 
Q’s truth. Finally, in accepting E1, one commits oneself, on pain of contradicting 
oneself, to not accepting ¬P (i.e., to the truth of ¬◻¬P). Hence in accepting both E1 
and E2 one is committed to the truth of every conjunct of E3’s antecedent. Thus if one 
accepts E3 too, one is committed to the truth of E4. In short, Argument E is, if not 
classically valid, still ‘valid’ in some clear sense of that term. It is precisely this 
species of validity that is analyzed by Strong RL. Strong RL classifies Argument E as 
valid, because E4 can be derived from E1, E2 and E3 with the help of U and V. 
(Specifically, U enables ◻P to be derived from E1; V enables Q to be derived from 
E2; and V’s contrapositive, V!, enables ¬◻¬P to be derived from E1.) 
 
3.5$Classifying$RL$
RL is a non-monotonic logic, since adding ¬◻φ to premises that reticently 
entail φ yields premises that don’t reticently entail φ. It is a deductively incomplete 
logic since there can be a φ such that neither φ nor ¬φ is reticently entailed by the 
premises (as when the premises classically entail both φ and ¬◻ ︎φ). 
RL has some resemblance to a modal logic. For example, RL’s U amounts to a 
strengthened version of K’s Necessitation Rule, and RL’s V is identical to modal 
logic’s axiom M. However, RL doesn’t respect K’s Distribution Axiom, 
◻ ︎(φ→ψ)→(◻ ︎φ→◻ ︎ψ),  and so it is certainly not a standard modal logic. 
 
4.$Can$a$consistent$artificially$intelligent$machine$prove$it$is$consistent?$
The project of developing RL in detail is a book-length one. I leave it for 
another occasion. The remainder of this paper is devoted instead to showing that RL 
has important philosophical applications. 
Consider Argument G: 
 
G1. F is consistent 
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G2.  If F is consistent, then F will not prove G(F) 
G(F).  F will not prove G(F) 
 
 Here F denotes some formal system, and G(F) is an English rendering of F’s 
Gödel sentence. Gödel (1931) showed that, provided F uses various classical rules of 
inference such as modus ponens (see, e.g., Raatikainen, 2014) and encodes 
elementary arithmetic, then if F proves its own consistency (i.e., if it proves G1) it 
will be driven, by Argument G, to accept G(F), from which it follows that F is 
actually inconsistent. Since digital computers amount to instantiations of formal 
systems, this result – Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem – can be taken (see, 
e.g., Gaifman, 2000) as implying that no artificially intelligent digital computer can 
prove its own consistency except on pain of inconsistency. 
I believe that Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem has no such 
implications. To see why not, let us analyze ‘proof’ as being a species of 
‘acceptance’, and use ‘◻ ︎φ’ to represent the claim, ‘F will prove φ’. Argument G can 
then be formalized as follows: 
 
G1!. Con(F) 
G2!.  Con(F)→¬◻ ︎G&(F) 
G&(F).  ¬◻ ︎G&(F) 
  
This argument is perverse, since its premises entail both G&(F) and (same 
thing) ¬◻ ︎G&(F). Needless to say this perversity is crucial to Gödel’s argument, since 
his strategy for proving the second incompleteness theorem hinges entirely on the 
idea that F will falsify Argument G’s conclusion, and thereby falsify one of the 
argument’s premises (namely, G1) in the very act of proving this selfsame conclusion. 
Let us suppose that F is an artificially intelligent system that reasons 
reticently, rather than classically. In this case Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem 
will not apply to it. While the theorem applies to any formal system that satisfies 
certain, modest requirements, one of these requirements is that the system uses 
classical logic. If F does not obey the various rules of classical logic, including modus 
ponens, then F need not be driven by the logic it is using from proving G1 and G2 to 
proving G(F). Indeed if – as we are imagining – the non-classical logic used by F is 
RL, then F certainly will not prove G(F) after accepting G1 and G2: for it will instead 
recognize that Argument G is perverse and refuse to prove G(F) for this reason. 
Because it won’t prove G(F), it won’t be caused, by its having proved G1 and G2, to 
undermine its own consistency by proving G(F). Thus – at least for all Gödel’s 
argument shows – it is entirely possible for such a system, which reasons reticently 
rather than classically, to prove both G1 and G2 (and thus prove its own consistency) 
without thereby tumbling into inconsistency.  
For the reasons just given, it appears that consistent artificially intelligent 
computers will be unable to prove their own consistency only if they must reason 
classically, rather than reticently. But why couldn’t an artificially intelligent machine 
reason reticently? Why not indeed! It is surely plausible that any machine that is truly 
‘intelligent’ will be capable of recognizing whether, in accepting various premises, it 
has committed itself to not proving a conclusion that follows classically from these 
premises, and of refusing to prove the conclusion in such cases. That is, machines that 
are genuinely intelligent will surely not be prone to succumbing to fallacies of 
perversity and neo-perversity. They will use RL, not CL. 
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5.$A$rebuttal$of$the$mathematical$argument$against$artificial$intelligence$
The ‘mathematical argument’ against artificial intelligence (Gödel, 1951; 
Nagel and Newman, 1957; Lucus 1961, 1996; Penrose 1989, 1994, 1996) purportedly 
shows that the theorem-proving abilities of the human mind cannot be matched by a 
computer. There is widespread agreement among philosophers and mathematicians 
that the argument is defective, but less agreement as to why. In what follows I first 
consider several stock rejoinders to the argument, and show that the argument can be 
patched to avoid them. Next I contend that the real problem with the argument 
involves a perversity fallacy within it. 
Let the mathematical argument’s ‘protagonist’ – referred to in the first person 
– be some human mathematician. Let F be some formal system (or programmed 
digital computer). ‘I am F’ is the conjecture that the protagonist’s sentence proving 
dispositions match F’s. Let this conjecture be called the ‘identity hypothesis’. The 
original version of the mathematical argument, found in Lucus (1961) and Penrose 
(1989), may be summarized as follows: 
  
H1.  I am consistent (i.e., I won’t, for any sentence φ, prove both φ and ¬φ). 
H2. If I am F, then F is consistent. (From H1.) 
H3. If F is consistent, then I can prove F is consistent. 
H4. If I can prove F is consistent then (by invoking Gödel’s first incompleteness 
theorem) I can know that G(F) is true. 
H5. If I can know that G(F) is true, then I can prove G(F) without compromising 
my consistency. 
H6. If I am F, then I can prove G(F) without compromising my consistency. (From 
H2 – H5.) 
H7. If I am F, then I cannot prove G(F) without compromising my consistency. 
(From Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem.) 
H8. I am not F. (From H6 and H7, by reductio.) 
 
The most glaring point of weakness in Argument H is H3. Many authors (e.g., 
Putnam, 1960; Bowie, 1982; Barr, 1990; Boolos, 1990; and Gaifman, 2000) have 
pointed out that there is ample room to imagine that: (i) the protagonist’s sentence-
producing powers might be equivalent to those of some consistent formal system, F; 
but that (ii) the protagonist might be unable, because of F’s great complexity, to prove 
that F is consistent.  
Penrose has developed an ingenious new version of the mathematical 
argument that sidesteps this problem (1994, pp. 179-188; 1996). It is sometimes 
called Penrose’s ‘new argument’, but I will call my formulation of it ‘Argument J’. 10 
It is based on the idea that we need not require the protagonist to prove that F is 
consistent ‘from the ground up’, as it were, because we can instead start from the 
assumption (contained in H1) that the protagonist herself is consistent, and then !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 There is some question as to precisely how Penrose’s ‘new argument’ is supposed to go (see 
Chalmers 1995; Penrose 1996; Lindström 2001, 2006; Shapiro 2003). My Argument B is closely based 
on Penrose’s (1994) original, informal presentation of the argument, and its essential logic is similar to 
Lindström’s (2001) formulation. Departing from Penrose, I frame the argument in terms of the 
consistency of the formal systems in question, instead of the soundness of these systems, with the 
reason being that the former notion is less demanding and more general than the latter but still adequate 
for the argument’s purposes. 
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cantilever sideways from this starting point to the conclusion that, if the identity 
hypothesis is correct, then F must be consistent too. The argument requires as a 
premise not only that the protagonist is consistent, but also that she knows she is 
consistent. Since she knows she is consistent, she can know that, if ‘I am F’ is true, 
then F is consistent. She doesn’t know whether F is in fact consistent (because she 
doesn’t know whether ‘I am F’ is true), but as an intellectual exercise she can imagine 
that ‘I am F’ is true and explore the logical consequences of this supposition. In doing 
this she will prove various sentences of the form, if I am F then φ. If ‘I am F’ is in fact 
true then any such sentence that she can prove will also be proved by F. Penrose has 
us consider another formal system F&, which is like F but which internalizes ‘I am F’ 
as an extra axiom. Thus, if F proves any sentence of the form if I am F then φ, F& will 
instead simply prove φ. Penrose observes that if F is consistent, and if ‘I am F’ is true, 
then F& must be consistent too. Thus the identity hypothesis implies, not only that F is 
consistent, but also that F& is consistent, and thus (via Gödel’s theorems) that F&’s 
Gödel sentence, G(F&), is true. The argument’s protagonist can recognize this (for we 
can recognize this), so she can prove the sentence, ‘if I am F, then G(F&)’. If the 
identity hypothesis is in fact correct, then F will prove this sentence too. But if F 
proves this sentence, then F& will prove G(F&), which, by Gödel’s theorem, is 
something it cannot do if it is consistent. In short, the identity hypothesis implies both 
that F& is consistent, and that F& will prove G(F&) –  contradicting Gödel’s theorem. 
Hence the identity hypothesis must be false. More formally: 
 
J1.  I am consistent, and I know it. 
J2. If I am F, then F is consistent. (From J1.) 
J3. If I am F and F is consistent, then F& is consistent (where F& is a formal system 
obtained by adding an extra axiom, ‘I am F’, to F, so that F& proves φ iff F 
proves ‘If I am F then φ’). 
J4. If I am F, then F& is consistent. (From J2 and J3.) 
J5. If F& is consistent, then G(F&). (From Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem.)  
J6. If I am F, then G(F&). (From J4 and J5.) 
J7.  I know that J1, J3, and J5 are true. 
J8.  If I know that J1, J3 and J5 are true, then I know that I can, by proving J6, 
prove a truth (since I can see that J6 follows from J1, J3 and J5). 
J9.        If I know that I can, by proving J6, prove a truth, then I will prove J6.  
J10. I will prove J6. (From J7 – J9.)  
J11. If I am F, and if I will prove J6, then F will prove J6. 
J12.    If F will prove J6 then F& will prove G(F&) (since J6 is of the form ‘if I am F, 
then φ’, with G(F&) replacing φ). (From what J3 says about F&.)  
J13. If I am F, then F& will prove G(F&). (From J11 and J12.) 
J14. If F& is consistent, then F& will not prove G(F&). (From Gödel’s first 
incompleteness theorem.)  
J15. If I am F, then F& will not prove G(F&). (From J4 and J14) 
 
J16. I am not F. (From J13 and J15, by reductio.) 
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Three objections to Argument J are now considered.11 The most popular 
objection targets the claim that the protagonist is consistent and knows it (i.e., 
premises J1). For instance, according to Turing (1947, 1948, 1950) the moral to be 
drawn from Gödel’s work is that one can be intelligent enough to reason about the 
incompleteness theorems only if one is also so prone to error that no confidence can 
be put in the consistency of one’s beliefs. In Turing’s words, ‘if a machine is expected 
to be infallible, it cannot also be intelligent’ (1947). For Turing, fallibility – and a 
concomitant ability to make mistakes and then learn from them – is an essential 
ingredient of intelligence. Other authors (e.g., Grush and Churchland 1995) take the 
less radical position that, even if fallibility is perhaps not necessary for intelligence, it 
is nevertheless such an ineluctable feature of human performance that no human 
mathematician can know she is consistent. 
Argument J can, I believe, be patched up to make it invulnerable to such 
objections by supposing that the argument’s protagonist is what I will call a ‘careful 
typist’. A careful typist is a person who evinces ordinary human fallibility in her day-
to-day affairs (and who often makes mistakes and learns from them, as Turing says an 
intelligent being must), but who is charged with using a typewriter to produce a 
sequence of true sentences, and who takes the utmost care never to type a sentence 
unless she has a proof of its truth that meets the most exacting standards of simplicity, 
rigor and clarity. Whenever in doubt about the truth of a sentence, she errs on the side 
of caution and doesn’t type it. Argument J is silent on what the protagonist must do to 
‘prove’ a sentence. There is therefore nothing to prevent us stipulating that the 
protagonist ‘proves’ a sentence by typing it with the typewriter in question. She will 
therefore be ‘consistent’ iff the list of sentences she types is free of contradictions. 
(Mistakes she makes elsewhere in life will be irrelevant.) Provided the protagonist is 
such a ‘careful typist’, it is surely plausible that she might both be consistent and 
know she is consistent. 
A similar objection (Chalmers 1995 and McCullough 1995) challenges the 
claim that the protagonist can know she is consistent (i.e., premise J1) based on 
Gödellian considerations.12 Specifically, according to this objection the protagonist 
will, if the identity hypothesis is true, lapse into inconsistency in the very act of 
proving herself consistent (i.e., in the act of proving J1). However, as was explained 
in §4, Gödel’s demonstration that a formal system will lapse into inconsistency if it 
proves itself consistent rests, in part, on the assumption that the system reasons 
classically, rather than reticently. The present objection is therefore dispensed with by 
supposing that the protagonist reasons reticently. 
The last objection I consider (e.g., Robinson 1992, and Benacerraf 1968) 
targets premise J7 on the basis that, due to F&’s complexity, its Gödel sentence, G(F&) 
would be such a stupendously large sentence of arithmetic that the protagonist would 
be unable to construct it, leaving her unable to know that J5 is true (and thus in no 
position to prove J6). This objection can be fended off by arranging for the 
protagonist to use a language in which a syntactically concise version of F&’s Gödel 
sentence can be constructed. The following stipulations achieve this result: 
 
• We use some name – say, ‘ℱ’– as a name for F&. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 Most of these objections were initially conceived as objections to the original version of the 
mathematical argument, but apply equally against Argument J.   
12 Chalmers uses Löb’s theorem, rather than Gödel’s theorem (but these two theorems are intimately 
related). 
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• We adopt some arbitrary method (say, some lexicographic method) for assigning 
Gödel numbers to sentences of English.  
• We let Sub(x,y) be the Gödel number of the sentence obtained by putting the 
number x in place of each occurrence of the lone free variable (if any) in the 
sentence with the Gödel number, y. 
• We let D(y) be the diagonalizing sentence, ‘ℱ does not prove Sub(y,y)’ 
• We let d be D(y)’s Gödel number. 
• Thus D(d) says, ‘ℱ does not prove D(d)’.13 
 
Notice that D(d) is a self-referential sentence, that is true iff F& does not prove 
D(d). Thus D(d) is – just like G(F&) –  a Gödel sentence of F&. This will come as no 
surprise since the above ‘recipe’ for constructing D(d) closely mirrors Gödel’s own 
recipe for constructing G(F&), with the only differences being that it uses English 
instead of Peano Arithmetic and uses the name, ℱ, instead of F&’s (immensely large) 
Gödel number.14 Importantly, whereas the task of constructing G(F&) is perhaps 
beyond the powers of a human, there seems nothing to prevent the protagonist from 
constructing D(d). All she must do, when presented with a system, F, that allegedly 
models her own mathematical competency, is conceive of F& (a system obtained by 
adding the extra axiom, ‘If I am F’, to F), invent a name for it, and use this name in 
the above recipe. Having constructed D(d) in this way, she can use it as a ‘stand in’ 
for G(F&) within Argument J, as she sets about using this argument to refute the 
identity hypothesis. 
At this point I hope the mathematical argument is beginning to look rather 
more compelling than it is generally given credit for. For reasons just outlined 
premises J1 and J7 seem robust. The remaining premises all appear unassailable, 
being in most cases either tautologies or provable theorems.  
So, should we accept the mathematical argument’s conclusion, and the 
implication that human theorem-proving powers exceed those of any formal system or 
digital computer? I think not. We should instead reject J8:15 
 
J8. If I know that J1, J3 and J5 are true, then I know that I can, by proving J6, prove a 
truth (since I can see that J6 follows from J1, J3 and J5). 
 
J8 appears innocuous at first blush: if one can see that the premises of a 
manifestly classically valid argument are true, then – so it would seem – one can 
prove the conclusion, safe in the knowledge that one is proving a truth. But the main 
theme of this paper has been that such reasoning can be dangerous. We have seen that 
if an argument is perverse then accepting its premises involves committing oneself, on 
pain of having accepted a falsehood, to not accepting its conclusion. To prove the 
conclusion in such a case would be to falsify at least one of premises and commit the 
perversity fallacy. If the argument, J1, J3, J5 ⊢ J6 is perverse, then J8 is false. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 This formulation of Gödel’s diagonalization procedure is based on (Rucker 1982, p. 284). 
14 When we ask whether the human protagonist in the mathematical argument can prove things a 
formal system cannot, we should not force her to use Gödel numbers and Peano arithmetic, which play 
to the strengths of formal systems, instead of names and natural language, which play to the strengths 
of the human mind. To do so would be to make her fight with one arm tied behind her back. 
15 The corresponding premise in Argument H is H5, which is problematic for the same reasons as J8. 
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And, indeed, J1, J3, J5 ⊢ J6 is perverse. To see why it is perverse, we must 
understand why the premises J1, J3 and J5 together entail, not only that J6 is true, but 
also that the protagonist will not prove J6. The explanation is as follows. In accepting 
J1, the protagonist accepts that she knows she is consistent. Were she to carelessly 
prove a sentence that might, as far as she knows, be contradictory, she would not 
know she was consistent, and so J1 would be false. Hence in accepting J1 she is 
committed to being careful not to undermine her own consistency. Now, for all that 
has been shown at this early point in Argument J, the identity hypothesis might be 
true: i.e., the protagonist’s sentence proving dispositions might be the same as F’s. 
So, as part of guarding against undermining her own consistency, the protagonist 
must be careful not to do anything that would undermine her consistency if the 
identity hypothesis happened to be true. With this thought in mind, let us imagine that 
the identity hypothesis is in fact true and that the protagonist proves J6. This being so, 
F will prove J6 too. If F proves J6, then F& proves G(F&). But if F& proves G(F&), then, 
by Gödel’s theorem, F& is inconsistent. It would follow from this that J4 was false 
(since J4 says ‘if I am F, then F& is consistent’). But if J4 is false then J1 must be false 
too, since J4 is derived from J1 by valid arguments having only one other, 
tautological premise (J3). And so the protagonist would in this case, by proving J6, 
have undermined her own grounds for accepting J1. The moral of this story is that the 
protagonist can know she is consistent, and J1 can be true, only if the protagonist 
won’t take the risk of lapsing into inconsistency involved in proving J6. In short, J1 
entails that the protagonist will not prove J6, from which it follows immediately that 
J1, J3, J5 ⊢ J6 is a perverse argument. (Its premises entail both J6, and that the 
protagonist won’t prove J6.) Thus J8 is false and the mathematical argument is 
unsound. 
If the above analysis is right then the mathematical argument is valuable, not 
because it shows that the human mind’s problem-solving powers exceed those of a 
machine (it doesn’t), but because it provides a wonderful, non-contrived example of a 
case where one must reason reticently, rather than classically, to avoid succumbing to 
a perversity fallacy.  
 
6.$Conclusion$
In this paper I have shown that CL exposes us to a kind of fallacy – the 
‘perversity fallacy’ – wherein one accepts the conclusion of a classically valid 
argument even though its premises entail that one will not accept it, with the result 
that one falsifies the premises and undermines one’s grounds for accepting the 
conclusion in the very act of accepting it. I have argued that we should instead reason 
in accordance with RL – a logic that includes a ‘perversity check’. I have briefly 
sketched several versions of RL, and demonstrated that the notions of perversity and 
reticence have an important bearing on major issues in the philosophy of artificial 
intelligence. 
Issues raised by this paper that for reasons of space I must save for future 
work include: (i) applying RL to analyzing Moorean sentences and what Sorrensen 
(1988) calls ‘blindspots’; (ii) using RL to critique the doctrine that knowledge and/or 
justified belief is deductively closed; (iii) investigating ‘higher-order perversities’ 
(wherein the premises of an argument entail, not only that one won’t accept the 
conclusion, but also that one won’t detect the perversity); (iv) contrasting RL with 
other non-classical logics; and (v) further investigating the properties of weak and 
strong RL. 
! 15!
 
Acknowledgements$
 Many thanks to Thomas Forster, Matthew Grice, Doukas Kapantais and 
Michael-John Turp for comments and suggestions. 
 
References$!
Barr, M. (1990). Review: The Emperor’s New Mind. By Roger Penrose. The 
American Mathematical Monthly, 97(10), 938-942.   
 
Benacerraf, P. (1968). God, the devil and Gödel. The Monist, 51, 9-32. 
 
Boolos, G. (1990). On seeing the truth of the Gödel sentence. Behavioral and Brain 
Sciences, 13(4), 655-6. 
 
Bowie, G. L. (1982). Lucas’ number is finally up. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 
41(3), 279-285. 
 
Chalmers, D. (1995). Minds, machines, and mathematics. A review of Shadows of the 
Mind by Roger Penrose. Psyche, 2, 11-20.   
  
Gaifman, H. (2000). What Gödel’s incompleteness result does and does not show. 
 The Journal of Philosophy, 97(8), 462-470. 
 
Gödel, K. (1931). Über formal unentscheidbare Sätze der Principia Mathematica und 
verwandter Systeme I. Monash. Math. Phys., 38, 173-198. 
 
Gödel, K. (1951). Some basic theorems on the foundation of mathematics and their 
implications. In Gödel (1995) (pp. 304-323). 
 
Gödel, K. (1995). Collected works, vol. III: unpublished essays and lectures. (S. 
Feferman, et al., eds.) Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
  
Grush, R. & Churchland, P. (1995). Gaps in Penrose’s toilings. Journal of 
Consciousness Studies, 2(1), 10-29. 
 
Lindström, P. (2001). Penrose’s New Argument. J. Philosophical Logic, 30, 241-250. 
 
Lindström, P. (2006). Remarks on Penrose’s New Argument. J. Philosophical Logic, 
35, 231-7. 
 
Lucas, J. R. (1961). Minds, machines and Gödel. Philosophy, 36, 112-127. 
 
Lucas, J. R. (1996). Minds, machine and Gödel: a retrospect. In P.J.R. Millican and 
A. Clark, eds., Machines and Thought: The Legacy of Alan Turing, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 103-124. 
 
! 16!
McCullough, D. (1995). Can humans escape Gödel? A review of Shadows of the 
Mind by Roger Penrose. Psyche, 2(23), 57-65.   
 
Nagel, E. & Newman, J. (1957). Gödel’s proof. New York: New York University 
Press. 
 
Penrose, R. (1989). The emperor’s new mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Penrose, R. (1994). Shadows of the mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Penrose, R. (1996). Beyond the doubting of a shadow. Psyche, 2(23), 89–129.  
 
Putnam, H. (1960). Minds and machines. In Sidney Hook, ed., Dimensions of mind: a 
symposium. New York University Press. Reprinted in Anderson, A. R., ed., 1964. 
Minds and machines. Prentice-Hall, 77. 
 
Raatikainen, P. (2014). Gödel's incompleteness theorems. The Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition). Edward N. Zalta (ed.). 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/goedel-incompleteness/. 
 
Robinson, W. (1992). Penrose and mathematical ability. Analysis, 52(2), 80-87. 
 
Rucker, R. (1982). Infinity and the mind: the science and philosophy of the infinite. 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.  
 
Shapiro, S. (2003). Mechanism, truth and Penrose’s New Argument. J. Philosophical 
Logic, 32, 19-42.  
 
Sorensen, R. (1988) Blindspots. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
Turing, A.M. (1947). Lecture to the London Mathematical Society on 20 February 
1947. Reprinted in D.C. Ince (1992), ed., Collected works of A.M. Turing: mechanical 
intelligence, Amsterdam: North Holland.  
 
Turing, A.M. (1948). Intelligent machinery. Reprinted in D.C. Ince (1992), ed., 
Collected works of A.M. Turing: mechanical intelligence, Amsterdam: North Holland.  
 
Turing, A.M. (1950). Computing machinery and intelligence. Reprinted in D.C. Ince 
(1992), ed., Collected works of A.M. Turing: mechanical intelligence, Amsterdam: 
North Holland.  
